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Abstract
A Marxist interpretation of black attempts at political self-definition in 
South Africa
In  this article I  address the prob lem  o f  p o litica l self-defin ition  in South  
Africa. I  a ttem pt to trace a n d  explain the rise o f  p o litica l consciousness 
am ong  the black peo p le  o f  South  A frica  a n d  indicate that the rise o f  
po litica l consciousness was expressed in a  M arxist a ttem pt at p o litica l self- 
defm itio rP  This a ttem pt has conceptual connections w ith com m unitarian  
politics, which explains w hy it was so  easily  accep ted  by  b lack people.
B lack C onsciousness made room fo r  a  w ider po litica l consciousness which  
included  elem ents o f  traditional com m unitarian po litics a n d  elem ents o f  
M arxism .
1. Stating the problem
How a community understands itself underpins its own cultural bias. In keeping 
with contemporary understanding o f culture as an open-ended resource 
(Thornton, 1988:17), built up through history -  a resource on which members of a 
community draw to mediate the exigencies o f their everyday lives, a community’s 
self-understanding is at any given time in its history the bedrock o f its cultural 
capital, providing at once
•  an interpretive framework for the generation o f social meaning (especially as 
this relates to the generation o f a political identity),
•  a marker for the boundaries of social identity and choice,
•  a conception o f the social processes by which social and cultural goods are 
produced and distributed.
The integrated sum o f these things we call a community’s self-understanding. A 
community’s self-understanding forms the bedrock o f its social and political 
identity. A community’s social identity is its characteristic way o f life which 
members have sustained over a considerable period o f time as an integrated
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cultural whole, and to which individual members stand in a dialogical relation i.e. 
one which supplies an interactive context in and through which they actualize 
their identities and exercise their choices.
A community’s political identity is its characteristic forms o f  institutional 
organization -  characteristic in the sense that these forms o f  organization reflect 
its cultural bias, and so provide distinctive avenues through which power is 
attained and exercised.
Ideally a community’s political identity should grow out o f its social identity. A 
community can be said to enjoy a coherent and stable social life if  its political life 
simply is institutionalized culture. This view o f a dependence relation between 
social and political identity poses some problems for culturally diverse and 
heterogeneous states like South Africa and, indeed, most o f the African states. 
The problem here is that diverse cultural communities which do not inhabit the 
same world o f shared social meanings and understandings co-exist within single 
political communities. Thus the following question arises: if  political communities 
do not inhabit the same world o f shared understandings, how do we conceive of 
the relation between social and political identity? The response to -this problem 
by African thinkers and politicians in South Africa have been conditioned by their 
experiences under the existential and social conditions o f the apartheid era. 
During the apartheid era this response took the form o f a Marxist transplant onto 
a traditional communal (communitarian) form o f social life. It is the object o f this 
article to explore the history and philosophy o f  the marriage between tradition 
and Marxism.
2. The background o f  white suprem acy
In South Africa the problem o f working out an acceptable political structure for 
diverse cultural communities had been delayed by the apartheid system. For 
better or worse, the growth o f a black culture o f resistance -  and with it a 
philosophy o f liberation -  was formatively linked to the search for an inclusive 
idea of political identity, one suited to culturally heterogeneous South Africa. But 
there were some major impediments to this search.
Various forms o f hegemony o f white over black -  institutional as well as 
ideological -  bequeathed a socio-economic landscape divided between a 
dominant white centre and a subordinate black periphery. This feature o f white 
centre pitted against black periphery played a major role in legitimizing the 
fragmentation o f South African society along racial and ethnic lines. The 
reduction o f  the black periphery to a marginalized area o f social life became a 
legitimate process in virtue o f  the self-legitimizing authority o f  the dominant 
consensus o f the centre. This is a typical feature o f societies containing
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marginalized groups -  in such societies the centre is usually the source of 
legitimation.
It is a truism to say that the social and political identities constructed in the centre 
were ones conforming to white conceptions. Witness how “whiteness” colonized 
the public sphere in which the common life o f South African society is lived. 
White hegemony o f the centre and white control o f public space enabled the 
white middle-class to construct a picture o f the universality and objectivity o f its 
values, and through this claim to universality and to objectivity, to project a false 
view o f the nature o f a difference (McLaren, 1994:59-62). For a difference to be 
recognized as a significant difference (McLaren, 1994:55-59) requires that the 
claim to difference be offered in a specific social and/or historical context which 
is generally acknowledged or recognized as authoritative with respect to the 
alleged significance o f the claim. For instance, the claim (often made in the 
journals o f the Dutch Trekkers) that they, as whites, were the carriers o f a 
superior civilization, has significance as marking a (perceived) difference 
between them and the indigenous peoples o f Southern Africa. The significance of 
the claim as a marker o f difference derives from a 19th century milieu in which it 
was offered as a justification for aggressive European expansion. Today we 
recognize the social and historical situatedness o f the claim, and can deal with it 
as such. To recognize that the significance o f the claim rests on its embedded­
ness in social and historical circumstances is to see it as one should -  as a claim 
which has status as a marker o f difference between white and black, but one 
which can be challenged simply because it has a place in a specific social and 
historical milieu. As a marker of difference it has no status outside this milieu.
In South African society the 19th century world-view o f an expansionist Europe 
continued to prevail. Accordingly “difference” was seen to be a natural given, 
conforming to the order of nature (McLaren, 1994:59-61). In this context 
“difference” marked different essences (it is o f the essence o f being white to be 
superior, and o f the essence o f being black to be inferior), and essences were 
naturalized (the essential difference between black and white is a natural one, 
occurring as a matter o f fact in nature) so it seemed that the social and racial 
stratification of South African society conformed to the natural order o f things. 
As a marker o f difference then, the idea o f “white superiority” was removed from 
the social and historical setting in which such ideas standardly gain meaning, and 
so ceased to be (as it should be) a social and historical construction, becoming 
merely a tool o f oppression.
•  The delegitimization of black languages
This process o f social and racial stratification based on the interpretation of 
“difference” as “naturalized essence” had a counterpart in linguistic stratification. 
No black language ever became an official language. The delegitimization of
Koers 62(4) 1997:423-446 425
A Marxist interpretation o f  black attempts at political self-definition in South Africa
black languages as languages of the public domain had two major consequences: 
it denied black cultural groups a place in the articulation o f our society’s self­
understanding and it undermined the role o f their languages as purveyors o f 
culture. It is not difficult to see why these consequences occurred. Language is 
one carrier o f cultural symbols and meanings o f groups and thus plays a crucial 
role in constructing social identities. To the extent that black languages were 
marginalized as languages o f the public domain, to that extent their potential as 
rallying points o f resistance to social and racial rank ordering were diminished. 
The result was that black cultural symbols, and the meanings associated with 
those symbols, failed to become part o f the forms o f social and political life 
which were articulated and constructed in the centre.
The point at issue here runs much deeper. A language maintains its role as the 
medium through which conceptions o f social and political organization are 
articulated in a way which expresses a people’s cultural bias, if  its speakers are 
able to sustain their society as an integrated cultural whole over a long period of 
time. If not, a language loses its role as purveyor o f  culture. In South Africa the 
construal o f “difference” as “naturalized essence” formed part o f  a racist 
discourse through which black languages lost this status. In a milieu of 
discrimination and oppression it is easy to lose sight o f the proper status o f 
“difference” as a social and historical construction and to accept a stratification of 
racial and linguistic differences as part o f the natural order. It is not difficult to 
see that this stratification had the effect o f elevating “whiteness” to a norm-setting 
position, above the social and historical situatedness which the authority o f  such 
positions standardly have. It is then no accident that the common life o f South 
African society had been driven by standards o f excellence and achievement 
which derive from the cultural capital o f the white middle-class.
• The asocial and ahistorical situatedness of the authority of normsetters
The idea o f an acultural, ahistorical position for the authority o f  normsetters, and 
the talk of “naturalized essences” which became part o f  their (hegemonic) forms 
o f discourse, are good examples of how “truth” functions as a politicized 
commodity in repressive societies. It is largely through the role language plays in 
the construction o f  meaning and identity that the centre was able to manufacture a 
picture o f its asocial and ahistorical situatedness, and to project an image o f its 
standards as universal. For the white centre this privileged position had a 
significant spin-off. It became possible, by the same means, to construct pictures 
for others which they were persuaded to accept as constitutive o f their self-image. 
Hence blacks absorbed the idea o f their essential incompetence. Note how the 
alleged essentialist nature o f differences between groups became the source and 
justification o f a division of labour -  for whites positions o f  responsibility, for 
blacks the lower ranks o f  the jobs market. Note also how the alleged universalism 
o f the standards o f the centre profited by identifying the achievements of
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European culture with the achievements o f human civilization. The failure to see 
that these things are not co-extensive was part o f the failure to criticize forms of 
discourse which give little or no recognition to the specific and distinctive values 
which other cultures have to offer (McLaren, 1994:49), and which undermine 
their roles as the context in and through which other people actualize their 
humanity.
•  Public space as locus of action
All and all, black groups were reduced to the status o f “add-ons” to the centre 
(McLaren, 1994:49). We have said that a difference can be a marker o f rank. 
Qua  “difference” then, “add-ons” signify a representation from the centre o f 
groups accretively joined to a nucleus but which do not form an integral part o f it. 
This notion o f a “accretive addition” is best explained by considering the picture 
o f public space it generates: a public space is any locus o f “action-in-concert”, 
the site at which common action is co-ordinated through argument and 
persuasion. In this space the topic(s) o f conversation -  o f what gets included in 
the agenda -  is usually something over which competing groups -  including the 
“add-ons” -  struggle. Participation in this struggle is a push for justice (a push 
for a public debate on some issue o f unfairness).
Note, for instance, how various feminist movements had gone public over the 
question o f women’s rights, and forced a redrawing o f the boundary between 
“private” sphere and “public” sphere, pushing the question over the status o f 
women from the former to the latter in order that it may become debatable as a 
question within the realm o f justice. Similarly, pressures from the periphery over 
the question o f  civil and political rights for black people has been an attempt to 
go public and let justice be done by challenging the centre’s monopoly o f power. 
The kind o f  pressure which had been exerted clearly showed the limits o f the 
white model o f public space: it could maintain itself only by a highly question­
able delimitation between social spheres, some o f which were recognized as 
legitimate ones o f public debate, others not. So, for instance, “ labour” never 
figured as an item on the public agenda because this sphere of social life had 
become a centre o f black resistance to white power. It became part o f the public 
conversation only once the basis o f its exclusion -  the philosophy underlying the 
division o f labour -  had been challenged and overthrown. It is to this struggle -  
in essence a struggle over the question o f black political identity -  that we now 
turn.
3. The quest for political self-definition
The black resistance movements understood their task in a certain way: They 
took themselves to be opposing a racist ideology, one which claimed that whites 
are -  as a matter o f fact, a given o f nature -  superior to blacks .
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In very general terms ideology is usually described as a “ ‘science’ o f  ideas” 
which raises questions about the basis and validity o f our most fundamental ideas
-  ideas like the proper ordering o f social life, the nature o f justice, the moral 
requirements o f interpersonal relations, and so on. Ideological discourse is often 
contrasted with scientific discourse which, according to the preferred conception 
of the latter, is not value-laden (as ideological discourse is claimed to be), not 
dependent on any world-view or perspective (as ideological discourse is claimed 
to be), and aims at truth (which ideological discourse cannot do since it has no 
claims to objectivity or universality in all the senses o f these terms). This latter 
point is particularly interesting since it encapsulates much o f  M arx’s ideas on 
ideology (as formulated by Thompson, 1990:41). According to Marx
... ideology is a system  o f  representations w hich serves to sustain existing 
relations o f  class dom ination by orientating individuals tow ards the past 
rather than the future, or tow ards im ages and ideals w hich conceal class 
relations and detract from  the collective pursuit o f  social change.
In other words, ideology masks truth by propagating untruths. As Thompson 
(1990:35) makes the point that “ ideology ... is a theoretical doctrine and activity 
which erroneously regards ideas as autonomous and efficacious and which fails to 
grasp the real conditions and characteristics o f social-historical life” .
There are at least two critical themes which we must take note o f implicit in 
Thompson’s formulation o f M arx’s approach to ideology. We have already 
touched on them. They are:
• The erroneous asocial, ahistorical treatment o f the notion o f a difference 
through which whites aspired to dominate blacks, and the false asocial, 
ahistorical position o f the authority o f the white normsetters through which the 
values o f Western culture aspired to universal status.
•  The inequitable and unfair division o f labour which has thrived on the false 
propositions mentioned in the previous sentence.
Thompson’s formulation o f M arx’s approach to ideology is a pointer to the falsity 
o f racism, especially in its institutionalized forms. According to Marx all systems 
o f thought and ideas are always embedded in and determined by social and 
historical conditions, especially in the material conditions o f social life 
(McLellan, 1986:17). On his assumption o f the social determination o f human 
consciousness there can be no system o f thought or ideas which have claim to 
truth outside a social and historical context. This pushes white claims to a natural 
superiority back into a social and historical context where it can be exposed as 
the orthodoxy o f a group intent on maintaining its power. The division o f  labour 
between “mental” and “manual” thrived on a false sociology, one unconditioned 
by the material conditions o f social life and a history o f production. This false
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sociology produced a class division between black and white, the former 
becoming a labour class, the latter an entrepreneurial class with control over the 
means o f  production.
Marxism offers a particular view o f the nature o f society. According to Marx 
society is constructed by the way in which human beings respond to their material 
needs (needs for food, shelter, work, leisure time, and so on). Since these needs 
are satisfied through their labour (Kessler, 1987:41), Marx recognized labour as 
the fundamental human activity, and held that the only valid social science will be 
one which accepted labour as the starting point o f theorizing about society. So all 
social practices had to be explained with reference to labour, and this included 
the division o f labour which prevailed in any society since the division o f labour 
determined all social and economic arrangements. Marx believed that this starting 
point in labour secured for Marxism the only possible “correct view” o f society, 
and as such it generated a useful critique o f society: in any society in which an 
uneven distribution o f power and resources prevailed, an ideology could be 
found, masking perceptions o f a “true account” o f its proper social and economic 
organization (McLellan, 1986:14-16). Thus, in South Africa, a racist ideology 
created the illusion that the division o f labour between “mental” and “manual”, 
and the concomitant unequal distribution o f power and resources were glimpses 
o f a true reality in which whites were the “natural” leaders. What makes these 
racist ideas ideology (and hence false) was their distortion o f  the fact that at 
bottom the conflict in South Africa was a class conflict.
We have said that a racist ideology falsely portrayed South African society as 
cohesive rather than conflictual (as it in fact is), and falsely attempted to justify an 
unequal distribution o f power and resources with reference to a “natural order of 
things” . If we look beyond ideology we will see that South African society is 
indeed conflictual in nature, and that this conflict is due to two factors:
•  The division o f  labour, between “mental” and “manual” which empowered 
only whites, placing them in positions o f economic and political power.
•  The creation o f an open market economy, and a community in which 
individuals compete for motives of self-interest, with the concomitant loss of 
traditional communal social organizations in which the interest o f the 
individual coincided with that o f the community.
The first above-mentioned idea is an unwanted consequence o f the second. The 
exploitation inherent in the relations between the white capitalist class and the 
black labour class was conceded by the illusion of a free society based on the free 
exchange o f commodities. The kind of community which developed was the very 
antithesis o f what (in M arx’s view) community is all about. W e return later to
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this point. Here we merely note, in summary form, the negative picture Marx 
presents o f a class-divided society like South Africa.
In South Africa the best-off class (the whites) was also the ruling class i.e. its 
interests were served by the major political institutions, which included using all 
instruments o f coercion in favour o f the best-off class, at the expense o f the 
labouring class (the blacks).
It follows that the social arrangements acceptable to the best-off class would 
never be acceptable to the labouring class, and hence that a state o f conflict 
prevailed.
It also follows that inegalitarian distributions were likely to remain in force for as 
long as the best-off class strived to maintain its privileged position -  unless, o f 
course, it could be overthrown by force or any other means.
What makes ideas ideological was that they masked the true nature o f society, 
creating the illusion that an unequal distribution o f social and economic resources 
was symptomatic o f the proper ordering o f  relations between the classes. In other 
words, free exchange in a capitalist economy was simply a cover for a 
distribution in which one class (the whites) exploited another class (the blacks). 
Marx was intent on showing that a certain kind o f  social determination o f  thought 
led to ideological thinking.
Marx, however, operated on the assumption that all thought is socially 
determined: There can be no system o f thought and ideas which have a claim to 
truth outside the social/historical context in which thought and ideas arise. So, if 
this was true, M arx’s so-called “correct view” o f  society -  the whole picture o f 
understanding social arrangements in terms o f  labour, production and distribution
-  must be ideological too (McLellan, 1986:19-20). Marx did not draw a clear 
distinction between the idea o f socially determined thought and ideology in so far 
as he did not clearly show what kind o f social determination produces ideology. 
Marx can clearly not accept the view that all socially determined thought must be 
ideological, for this view turns his “correct view” o f  society into ideological 
thoughts as well. Yet Marx continued to call all systems o f  thought which 
perpetuate relations o f  domination (o f ruling class over labouring class) 
ideological -  a system o f thought which he contrasted with his “correct view”, 
and which he thought was the only correct (socialist) view.
3.1 A Marxist attempt at political self-definition
Black resistance to white oppression developed into a quest for political self­
definition. The initial attempt at political self-definition was modelled on a 
Marxist conception o f the just political order. Consider the following view:
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Exam ining Black C onsciousness as an ideology capable o f  challenging the 
cultural hegem ony o f  the w hite suprem acist regim e entails understanding 
the m ovem ent as the ethico-political w eapon o f  an oppressed  class 
struggling to reaffirm  its hum anity. ... It w ould be w rong to equate the 
Black C onsciousness m ovem ent w ith a  m ere cultural renaissance; it was 
indeed m ore than that. B lack C onsciousness recognized the centrality  o f  the 
m aterial conditions o f  existence and it w as precisely  because o f  these that it 
rejected collaboration with w hites ... (Falton, 1986:57-58).
The agenda for the creation of a Marxist political state began with the 
identification o f the black existential condition as that of
•  a labouring class, and hence
• a socially exploited group, intent on
• ending its exploitation by rising to political self-definition and power.
The Black Conscious Movement (henceforward the Movement) recognized that 
since colour determined the privileged position o f whites, there could be no 
alliance between black and white workers. White workers could not be regarded 
as genuine workers -  as members o f an oppressed and exploited class -  as long 
as they enjoyed white privileges (job reservation, higher wages, recognition of 
trade unions etc.) (Falton, 1986:84). Consequently, a genuine working class -  
which is formed when persons who perform the same function in the production 
process unite to defend their common interests -  did not develop for whites to the 
extent that it developed for blacks. Indeed, the Movement determined that all 
participants in white privilege were accomplices in oppression on the grounds 
that to participate was to fail to prevent crimes being committed against 
humanity. This meant that whites who were opposed to the apartheid system 
could not be included in the Movement since they were participants in the 
system.
These “ liberal” whites had to be watched lest they arrest and blunt the edge of 
black revolutionary zeal, for their “ ‘mosaic’ multi-racialism”1 was simply a cover 
for the maintenance o f  white power and privilege. The goal o f  racial integration 
propounded by these whites was a futile political gesture as long as white norms 
in culture, economics and morality remained ascendant. The critical point is that 
white norms represent the individualism o f the privileged class which was 
opposed to the communal outlook characteristic o f  African society. Falton 
(1986:86) expresses the point as follows: “ It [the Movement] condemned the 
conditions o f everyday life, the capitalistic-induced erosion o f communual 
solidarity, and African corporate personality.”
1 This expression is adopted from Ranevcdzi Nengwekhulu -  quoted in Falton (1986:84).
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The Movement had to exploit the solidarity o f African culture, and African 
cultural groups had to coalesce into a solid power block to bring down the white 
power structure. This meant, in effect, reviving the “consensual foundations” 
(Falton’s expression -  1986:86) o f African culture.
3.1.1 Towards self-definition: The social thesis
All persons have (legitimate) interests which they seek to promote through the 
channels which institutional structures create. The social preconditions for the 
effective fulfilment o f  a person’s interests are linked to a cultural context which 
gives form to these conditions. One crucial condition is the creation o f a context 
o f choice in and through which people actualize themselves. The social thesis 
which shall briefly be discussed is an essential ingredient o f traditional communal 
(communitarian) social organization onto which a Marxist picture o f  self­
understanding was grafted (Hountondji, 1983:142-147). In this respect some 
features o f the traditional picture which played a role in the development o f a 
hybrid Marxism will be indicated.
The particularity o f one kind o f a communitarian model is perhaps best 
exemplified by examining some o f  the essential social conditions which unite a 
community’s social and moral identity2 (Wiredu, 1992:80-93). It is a major 
assumption o f the approach adopted in this article that the capacity for moral 
choice and development can only be exercised in a cultural setting which makes 
provision for its growth. Let us call this the social thesis. The social thesis 
describes the •se/Z'-understanding o f one kind o f community and, as formulated 
below, shows one version o f the social meaning o f communitarian perspectival 
models. According to the social thesis an individual’s choice o f way o f life is a 
choice constrained by the community’s pursuit o f shared ends. This pursuit o f the 
common good is the primary goal o f the political community and always takes 
precedence over the pursuit o f individually chosen ends. Communual ends cannot
-  all other things being equal -  be overridden or vetoed because shared ends have 
much greater weight (value) in the life o f the community than other ends. The 
common good is conceived o f as being good because it fits the patterns of 
preferences o f individual members; this common good is not single-faceted, but 
implies many aspects, each fitting a sphere o f social life and resting on a 
consensus (agreement) about its value. The common good, then, define 
substantive conceptions about the good life -  identified for application in specific 
social contexts. The good life for an individual is conceived o f  as coinciding with 
the good o f the community, and a person’s choice is highly or lowly ranked
2 For my insights into African communitarianism I am indebted to W iredu (1992).
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according to the way in which it contributes to or detracts from the common 
good.
The social thesis describes linguistic communities (Bell, 1995:157-165). A 
linguistic community has a history and various traditions (of morality and 
reasoning) which inform the narratives o f individuals’ lives and link them to those 
o f their ancestors. Languages embody distinctive ways o f experiencing the world 
and thus play a crucial role in defining the experiences o f a community as their 
particular experiences. Since language is a determinant o f a particular outlook it 
is one significant factor that shape a way o f life. Speakers communicate with 
each other about their common history and have access to the significance of 
events in it in a way not communicable to non-speakers, or in other languages. 
This means that language never is just a neutral medium for communication or for 
identifying the contents o f actions -  rather language itself is content, a value­
laden reference for communual loyalties and animosities.
The social thesis also describes a community o f mutuality (Wiredu, 1992:80-93), 
one in which each member stands in a dialogical relation to other members, i.e. a 
relation which requires the recognition o f reciprocal obligations. In a community 
o f mutuality members recognize that since the (personal) projects they pursue, 
and through which they give meaning to their lives, projects are made available 
by a cultural structure. Thus they have -  all other things being equal -  a duty to 
sustain these structures. In so far as the recognition o f the need to preserve a 
cultural context is the prerequisite o f a meaningful life, it derives from the social 
meaning o f a socially embedded notion o f obligation.
According to the social thesis the community (and not individual members) is the 
locus o f deontology3 (Wiredu, 1992:80-93). The argument about morality and 
reason takes place within traditions. A major assumption o f this attempt to 
contextualize the argument is that beliefs about morality and reason cannot be 
successfully justified in detachment from actual ways o f life and the social 
meanings embodied in them. This point encapsulates the status o f the community 
as the locus o f deontology. The community is the focus o f  moral identification 
and hence those collective decisions always have overriding moral authority. The 
collective decision cannot be trumped by individual decisions because 
identification with the common good as the focus o f allegiance must remain 
paramount. The tension generated by the ensuing struggle between tradition and 
modernity is a familiar one: the longer a particular interpretation o f  a social 
practice goes back in time, the greater its historical significance. Traditions 
embody many years o f communual effort and thought, and it is unlikely that a
3 For this insight I am indebted to W iredu (1992).
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deeply held view will have failed to get something right regarding truth. But 
though deeply held views have historical depth in the sense just outlined, they are 
open to reinterpretation. Open-endedness is a general feature o f African 
traditions, so there is in principle no difficulty with reinterpreting the notion of 
“deeply held” to mean what is currently o f  greater importance or significance for 
a community (even if this conflicts with the commitments o f a community’s 
ancestors.)
3.1.2 Towards self-definition: The Marxist thesis
The social thesis we have examined forms part and parcel o f  the idea o f a 
communitarian ethic and community oriented policy. It forms part o f the 
traditional African picture o f values (Hountondji, 1983:142-147). This picture, 
however, has been significantly modified by input from Marxist ideology as a 
consequence of the racial stratification o f society in South Africa. In this section 
we shall take a critical look at the Marxist overlay in an attempt to see clearly 
what the lure o f Marxism added to black attempts at political self-definition.
The infiltration o f  Marxist ideology into traditional black conceptions o f social 
and economic life had a significant consequence: black intellectuals identified an 
open market economy as the backbone o f the apartheid system. Falton (1986:45) 
makes the point as follows:
It is precisely because racism  was such an active ideological force 
encroaching on the material base o f  society, that the South A frican political 
econom y developed as a Volkskapitalism e. ... V olkskapitalism e is a social 
system  in w hich a racially  determ ined hegem onic core, contro lling  the state, 
drains the econom ic surplus from a racially  determ ined subordinate 
periphery.
If Falton is right, racism was the main mover in the consciousness o f  black 
intellectuals towards the identification o f white political and economic arrange­
ments with an oppressive capitalist system. For them M arx’s labour theory 
provided a theory o f politics. Now, being a phenomenon articulated in specific 
contexts, politics is the ways and means by which social conflict and notably 
class conflict is manifested and managed. Marx clearly gives great weight to 
economic arrangements in his critique o f  society. “The mode o f  production o f 
material life conditions the social, political and intellectual life process in general. 
It is not the consciousness o f men that determines their being, but, on the 
contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness” (quoted in 
Miliband, 1990:7).
But this weight is due to M arx’s belief that human emancipation can never be 
achieved in the political realm alone, but requires revolutionary transformation of 
the economic and social order o f  capitalist society. O f course, in the Marxist
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scheme o f things, politics was taken to be an expression o f alienation, and 
emancipation was taken to mean the end o f this alienation -  in effect, the end of 
politics. Politics, then, was seen to have a determinate function: it is a necessary 
stage in the development towards the post-capitalist state, and as such it is an 
activity whose end is its own annulment.
3.1.2.1 Labour, conflict and alienation
The idea o f conflict lies at the core o f Marxist politics. In the Marxist scheme of 
things conflict is caused by a state o f domination (by the capitalist classes) and 
subjection (of the labouring classes), which is to be ended by a transformation of 
the conditions giving rise to it. For Marx conflict is inherent in the class system: 
domination and subjection are features o f class societies, and are based on 
specific features o f their modes o f production (McLellan, 1986:17-18). The 
essential feature is the distribution of the material and moral goods o f a society -  
a process, put and kept in motion by the dominant classes, to appropriate the 
greater share o f a society’s wealth, in order to maintain, strengthen and extend 
their dominant position.
Conflict is generated by the exploitation o f labour and the distribution o f the 
products o f  labour. Marx identified two areas in which those who controlled a 
society’s modes o f production maintained relations of domination and subjection:
•  Regarding “relations o f production” (quoted and discussed in Kymlicka 
1989:100-131) Marx believed that the mode o f production dehumanized the 
worker in her position in some production process, reducing her a cog in a 
machine with no control over the system which needed her labour.
•  Regarding “relations o f exchange” (quoted and discussed in Kymlicka 
1989:100-131) (i.e. distribution), Marx believed that the open market served 
only the interests o f the governing classes, i.e. it was the arena in which the 
labour o f the worker advanced the material and moral needs o f others.
In societies in which the modes of production served the ends o f  domination, the 
worker was denied her true nature as social being in three ways:4
•  Relations o f production separate workers from the individuating functions of 
their social roles, making it easy for them to be exploited as a labouring class. 
Relations o f production become exploitive not only in the sense that workers 
are unable to discover the good in their roles, but also in the sense that they 
become the means to the enrichment o f someone else in the ruling class.
4 For these insights I am indebted to Kymlicka (1989).
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•  Relations o f production alienate (separate) the worker from the products of 
her labour, from herself in so far as the individuating function o f  a social role 
is denied her, and from society, in so far as she has no voice in the articulation 
of her community’s self-understanding.
•  Relations o f production divide the workers’ life into a “private” and a “public” 
sphere, the latter becoming the domain o f the ruling classes, and public 
institutions’ instruments o f class rule. The point to note here is very 
significant: the public sphere o f  social life is supposed to be the arena where 
all individuals pursue the common good as their individual good. It is in this 
arena where social forces meet and engage in dialogue in order to determine 
the community’s political agenda. Social forces, then, are always (potentially) 
political forces. Social forces gain political clout when they gain a foothold in 
the public forum, because then the issues they wish to discuss become issues 
about justice. All this means that, if  Marx is right, the ruling classes have 
silenced the political will o f  the labouring classes by their control over the 
public sphere.
3.1.2.2 C lass consciousness and the classless utopia
By regarding the worker as a class against capital, Marx assigned a political 
criterion to the notion of a working class (Miliband, 1990:22). For Marx no class 
is truly a class unless it acquires the capacity to organize itself politically. Being 
politically organized brings with it the notion o f a “class consciousness” 
(Miliband, 1990:31-41) -  the consciousness which the members o f a class have 
o f its “true” interests. What are the w orkers’ “true” interests?
If Marx is right our “true” interests are satisfied through labour; labour is the 
fundamental human activity, and the only valid starting point o f theorizing about 
society. All social practices have to be explained with reference to labour, 
including the division o f labour between “mental” and “manual” . Marx believed 
that his starting point in labour would secure for Marxism the only possible 
“correct view” o f society, and as such it would generate a useful critique: in any 
society in which an uneven distribution o f power and resources occurs, and 
ideology could be found masking perceptions o f a “true account” .
What makes ideas ideological for Marx, then, was that they masked the true 
nature o f society, creating the illusion that an unequal distribution o f  social and 
economic resources was symptomatic o f the proper ordering o f the relation 
between the classes. The “true account” -  an account focusing on labour and 
class-conflict as constituting the proper ordering o f  relations -  must show that 
free exchange in a capitalist economy was simply a cover for a way of 
distribution in which the ruling classes exploit the labouring classes. In other
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words, the “true account” must strip the ruling class o f its ideology, and expose it 
for what it is.
Thus it was necessary to show that the ruling classes engage in deliberate 
deception, whereby their spokesmen (or “ideologues”) attempt to persuade the 
subordinate classes o f the universal validity o f principles (of social and economic 
organization) which they know to be partial and class-bound, but which they 
propagate for its utility in the maintenance o f the given social order. But this is 
just one side o f a fake coin. The other side portrays the working classes as a 
constituent o f a universal social order in which their labour has a subordinate 
place. But labour, for Marx, is the primary constituent o f human culture. This 
being so, a radical rupture with tradition -  especially traditional property relations
-  is called for (Miliband, 1990:36). Only the labouring classes are capable of 
acting on behalf o f society, to remove from it the greatest impediment to the 
realization o f true human nature, viz, the capitalist mode o f production. In 
sweeping away the traditional modes o f production, the working classes will also 
have swept away the conditions for the existence of class conflict, as well as the 
very notion o f a class itself. This end-point o f the class-less society Marx 
identified with the arrival o f the communist utopia.
M arx’s idea o f the “class-consciousness” o f the labouring classes, then, may be 
taken to mean the understanding that the emancipation o f the working classes, 
and o f  society, require the overthrow o f the capitalist system, and the will to 
overthrow it. With respect to the latter, Marx talked o f a revolutionary 
consciousness which involved a very definite political agenda. What was this 
agenda, and how was it argued for? As indicated above, the capitalist system 
failed to treat people as equals in two areas o f social life, in “relations of 
production” and “relations o f exchange” . In these contexts the ruling classes did 
not see themselves as responding to the legitimate labour-related needs o f others; 
indeed, in society they created social interactions which subverted the recognition 
o f these needs.
What would constitute a recognition o f these needs? Marx thought that the 
political agenda o f the labouring classes must give prominence to an equality 
principle (discussed in Kymlicka, 1989:100-131), which was expressed as 
follows:
•  Labourers have an equal right to the products of their labour
This principle has, however, to be qualified. We may make this point in terms of 
the familiar distinction between an equality o f  regard  and an equality o f outcome. 
With regard to the former, Marx maintained that all labourers are equally creators 
o f culture through their labour, and that this entitled them to an equality o f 
consideration (respect, dignity). In practice this meant that all labourers are 
entitled to equal consideration regarding the satisfaction o f their needs and
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desires. It did not mean that everyone’s needs and desires should be equally 
fulfilled, as an equality o f outcome requires. Marx favoured the idea o f  an 
equality of regard since it makes provision for unequal talents and unequal needs, 
which demand an unequal distribution o f the products o f labour. So the equality 
principle had to be amplified by the addition o f the following:
• To have an equal right to the products o f one’s labour is to have an equal 
right to unequal labour
The modified principle meant that if  you have greater talents, then a greater 
labour output is required o f you, and if you have greater needs then you are 
entitled to a greater share o f the total labour output, irrespective o f whether you 
produced the products o f labour or someone else. For Marx unequal talents and 
unequal needs are relevant moral differences between persons, which must be 
acknowledged in the distributive patterns o f social institutions. So, in M arx’s 
good society, the following principle o f distribution is the right one:
•  From each according to his talents, to each according to his needs
Some observation o f the latter point is called for. First it assumes a particular 
view o f the nature o f free choice. Briefly, the whole point o f sustaining a society 
run on a labour agenda is to abolish classes and class conflict. This agenda 
protects the avenues through which the labouring classes arrive at political self­
understanding, and as such creates a context o f choice for them. But acceptance 
o f the proposed political forms will lead to limitations on choice o f forms o f  the 
good life. This is unavoidable, though the reason should be obvious: the moral 
and material goods available to workers are all goods internal to a cultural 
structure (Buchanan, 1982:32), which is to say that these goods are available to 
them through their performance o f  structured roles in the labour market.
But we should take care not to misread the limitations in this view o f what 
constitutes choice. Marx offers a picture o f the emergence o f  the social individual 
as the foundation o f the good society. The social individual is intended to replace 
the competitive individual which capitalism creates in two areas o f  social 
interaction: “relations o f production” and “relations o f exchange” . In these two 
areas of social interaction conflicts arise from the very nature o f the unchosen 
relations between individuals. Now, as I understand Marx, the creation o f  the 
social individual will eliminate conflict since the social individual labours for the 
community (i.e. asserts no unjustified rights-claims to the common wealth). Note 
M arx’s claim in this regard: “relations o f production” and “relations o f 
exchange” are social processes in which affective ties between individuals will 
eliminate unchosen conflicts (Buchanan, 1982:31-35). In the communist state a 
social identity (as “labourers of the common good”) is a precondition o f  informed 
choice. Social interaction in the labour field would be governed by such choice, 
and would accordingly be harmonious (and not conflictual), because no one 
would choose ends which are in conflict with the common interest.
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Has Marx got hold o f the tmth here? One defence o f M arx’s notion o f choice
runs as follows (discussed in Kymlicka, 1989:100-131):
-  If we try to stand outside the roles o f society to arrive at a perspective from 
which to judge the value o f a choice (o f way o f life), we run into emptiness. 
The instruction freely to choose a way o f life gives no direction for choice, for 
such “ freedom” offers no determinable criterion o f what way o f life is good. 
We will not know that our choices are worth pursuing. This is because our 
ideas o f what it means to lead a valuable life is a consequence o f  our doing 
things directed at specific ends within a social context which provides criteria 
o f  worth and value. Free choice understood as something which has inherent 
worth or value is something we arrive at as a consequence o f action directed 
at or dedicated to other socially determined ends. In a Marxist society, geared 
as it is towards self-realization, no one is concerned with self-realization as an 
end which can be isolated and pursued for itself; they are rather (if Marx is to 
be believed) concerned with their work -  achieving or realizing the goods 
internal to their roles in labour -  as the means to freedom and self-realization. 
Freedom and self-realization come about as a consequence o f the achievement 
or realization o f their roles and purposes in the social fabric -  specifically in 
the context o f labour.
Another line o f defence runs as follows: M arx’s social individual cannot be a 
person whose freely chosen projects deny her social nature. This is because, 
in a communist state, choice is informed by social identity. In the communist 
state the worker sees her labour as satisfying her most important needs, and 
hence as her most important project. This makes for a co-operative way of 
life. If Marx is right, co-operation would outstrip competition because no one 
has any advantage over anyone else with regard to control over the 
instruments o f social and political power. Indeed, control would strictly be 
unnecessary because in the communist state the administration o f justice 
would not only be superfluous (there would be no need for competition over 
limited resources), but also undesirable (competition for resources -  limited or 
otherwise -  would be dysfunctional).
-  Secondly, the labour theory of politics emphasizes “relations o f production” 
and “relations o f exchange” as the foundation o f social interaction, and not 
notions o f distributive justice (discussed in Buchanan, 1982:50-69). 
According to Marx, as long as problems o f distributive justice sit at the centre 
o f our thinking, communities will be divided, and sectarian interests prevail. 
In such divided communities appeals to (redistributive) justice are attempts to 
remedy defects in the community. Such appeals are needed because the 
community is defective, being merely an arena in which persons act from 
motives o f self-interest in competition with others, rather than the arena in
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which members accept responsibility for fellow members in co-operative 
pursuit o f the common interest. The good communist community will have no 
need for appeals to (redistributive) justice and indeed, no need for justice, 
because members will make no (conflicting) claims to resources they regard as 
solely theirs. The point is, if  the community as a whole had an identity of 
interests, and members are bound by affective ties, justice is superfluous 
because no one needs to regard herself as a bearer o f rights who can at any 
time become involved in interpersonal conflicts over claims to resources -  
conflicts in which it is necessary to assert rights.5
A communist community will be one in which the communal interest remains 
paramount, and this requires the abolition o f  the division o f  labour between 
“mental” and “manual” which has characterized capitalist systems of 
production. The abolition o f this division o f labour will mean the abolition of 
private property, and with it one important cause o f conflictual relations 
between persons. The real evil that attaches to conflictual relations is that 
they are unchosen: workers find themselves in competitive relations with 
other workers, which require that they regard others as the means to the 
satisfaction o f their interests and this breaks down a sense of community in 
that an individual’s development and growth can be bought only at the 
expense o f others. Such conflictual relations must be replaced by a sense o f 
sociality based on productive work for the sake o f the community. This sense 
o f sociality would replace the need for justice because individuals would cease 
to have (unchosen) conflicting ends.
-  Thirdly, the labour theory o f politics seeks to create a revolutionary platform 
(Miliband, 1990:43-52). According to Marx,
[t]he ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas: i.e., the 
class, which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its 
ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material 
production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of 
mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those 
who lack the means of mental production are subject to it (quoted in 
Miliband, 1990:49).
M arx’s main target is, o f course, the labour process itself, in particular, the 
division o f labour between “mental” and “manual” . Capitalist “ relations of 
production” are, Marx argued, hierarchical, authoritarian, instilling in the worker 
a sense o f subordination as part o f the working-class culture. The cultural fall-out 
o f top-down authoritarian structures are, in the capitalist framework, strongly
5 For the comm unitarian interpretation o f  M arx I am indebted to Buchanan (1982).
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pervaded by commercialism and money values. The institutions through which 
the ideological hegemony o f the ruling classes was maintained, was controverted 
by Althusser (a follower of Marx) as “ideological state apparatuses” (Miliband, 
1990:54) (e.g. the system o f different public and private schools, the system of 
different political parties, state controlled media), the object being to show that 
the dominant capitalist class, under protection o f  the state, employs vast state 
resources to bring its own weight to bear on civil society. This blurs an important 
distinction between state and class power. Class power is power which a 
dominant class exercises to maintain its predominance in civil society, and as 
such may be legitimately challenged by any other (class-based) counter power. 
State power is something different. State power is neutral power (not the 
prerogative o f any class or pressure group), and is exercised through state 
institutions (e.g. police), and only in areas where a general consensus o f opinion 
in the community permits its use. Things go wrong as soon as class power is 
exercised through the agency o f the state, because the privileged class then 
commands vast state resources to oppress its opponents. When this happens the 
state itself enters into the “consciousness” creating industry (Miliband, 1990:49­
55), thereby obliterating ideological apparatuses which have an emancipatory 
function in civil society, turning them into state apparatuses where they lose this 
function.
The last points made here are important pointers to the Marxist theory o f political 
culture. The Marxist analysis o f conflict in the state as class-conflict, centred in 
the concept o f labour, implies that Marx did not see the capitalist state as the 
trustee o f society as a whole (Miliband, 1990:66-74). Rather, the working 
classes are society’s trustees. The idea that the capitalist state can be society’s 
trustee is, in the Marxist scheme, simply an ideological veil which the ruling, 
capitalist class draws over the reality o f its class-rule, so as to legitimate that 
rule. So the institutions o f state -  the law courts, the police force, the defence 
force, systems o f education etc. -  are never neutral, nor can they ever be neutral 
arbiters o f competing class interests. The state and its institutions are partisan. 
The ruling class not only owns and controls the predominant part o f the means of 
material production, it also owns and controls the means o f “mental” or 
“psychological” production. This is not a propagandist^ point: the claim, rather, 
is that once class power is translated into state power, the state loses its central 
function o f neutral administration. M arx’s labour theory o f culture proposes that 
any unification o f class and state power can only serve the interests o f the ruling 
class, because the state becomes an instrument o f the ruling class, i.e. it acts at 
the behest o f  the ruling class. The state, in fact, becomes a class state: it acts for 
the purpose o f maintaining the existing system o f domination through a system of 
centralization and the creation of monopolies. The creation o f a class state is, in 
M arx’s opinion, the outcome o f an ideological-cultural persuasion which his own 
theory was meant to counter.
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3.2 Communitarianism and Marxism
I have attempted to show what lure Marxism had for black intellectuals. In the 
political consciousness o f  black intellectuals the remedy was seen to be the 
creation o f a certain kind o f community, one in which the goods internal to 
communal relations (especially economic relations) are also personal goods. The 
working classes could be freed, and equality restored, by freeing people from 
alienation, which meant restoring the identity-defining function o f  their social 
roles and gaining a voice for them in the articulation o f the community’s self­
understanding -  in effect organizing the labour classes into a political force.
The lure o f M arx’s picture o f the good society can be explained with reference to 
the idea that in Marx the communal interest remains paramount, and this requires 
the abolition o f the division of labour (between “mental” and “manual”) which 
has characterized capitalist systems o f  production. I wish to argue that the 
labouring process, as explanatory model o f social evolution, combines a 
traditional communitarian picture with an overlay o f Marxism precisely because a 
racist ideology created racially divided classes. The racial character o f  relations 
between labour and capital were, in effect, the organizing principle o f  South 
African communities. Political power, the power o f  the state, played a primary 
role in the process o f integration, providing the necessary social preconditions for 
the existence of a capitalist economy. The political system was thus justified with 
reference to its consistency with policing the requirements affecting relations of 
production and exchange between labour and capital.
The link between communitarianism and Marxism is a consequence o f historical 
factors rather than a conceptual link. Paulin Hountondji (1983:146), commenting 
on the philosophy in Nkrumah’s Consciencism, observes that the book was a 
response to a classic objection:
... that in adopting socialism , A frica w ould be delivering h e rself to an 
imported ideology and betraying her original civilization. It w as precisely 
this issue, inspired by the m ost traditionalist cultural nationalism , that 
Nkrum ah tried to address in C onsciencism . The object o f  the book w as to 
link socialism  with the purest A frican tradition by show ing that socialism , 
far from being a betrayal o f  this tradition w ould actually  be its best possible 
translation into m odem  idiom.
In the 1964 edition o f  Consciencism  Nkrumah states the link as follows (quoted 
in Hountondji, 1983:144): “But because o f the continuity o f communalism with 
socialism in communalistic societies, socialism is not a revolutionary creed, but a 
restatement in contemporary idiom o f the principles underlying communalism .”
However, in the 1970 edition Nekrumah is no longer so strident.
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But because the spirit of communalism still exists to some extent in 
societies with a communalist past, socialism and communism are not, in a 
strict sense of the word, ‘revolutionary’ creeds. They may be described as 
restatements in contemporary idiom of the principles underlying 
communalism (quoted in Hountondji, 1983:144).
According to Hountondji, the 1970 edition accepts two premises denied in the 
1964 edition. They are Nkrumah’s acceptance o f the erroneous 1964 view that, 
prior to colonialism, class-divisions were unknown in Africa, and the acceptance 
o f “ the universality of class struggle” (Hountondji, 1983:146) as the basis o f all 
political revolution. Indeed, Nkrumah closely identifies colonialism with 
capitalism -  “a colonialist structure is essentially ancillary to capitalism” 
(Hountondji, 1983:144) -  just as black intellectuals in South Africa identified 
racism with capitalism.
Hountondji identifies two problems in the way o f realistic attempts at defending 
political identities in Africa. First, the attempt to oppose traditional African 
cultures to the colonizers’ cultures tends to “flatten” the traditional cultures, i.e. it 
denies them their “internal pluralism”, which, secondly, gives rise to a “back­
ward-looking” cultural nationalism, and which, most importantly, says 
Hountondji (1983:162) “ divert the attention o f the exploited classes from the 
real political and economical conflicts which divide them from the ruling classes 
under the fallacious pretext o f their common participation in ‘the’ national 
culture” .
Hountondji clearly has great sympathy with Nkrumah’s 1970 insights. He clearly 
sees Marxism as the African alternative to capitalist colonialism:
We must promote positively a Marxist theoretical tradition in our countries
-  a contradictory scientific debate around the work of Marx and his 
followers. For let us nor forget this: Marxism itself is a tradition, a plural 
debate based on the theoretical foundation laid by Marx (Hountondji, 
1983:183 -  emphasis added).
Hountondji’s remark concerning participation in “the” national culture is meant to 
bring home the idea that colonialism has “arrested” African cultures by “reducing 
their internal pluralism” (Hountondji, 1983:166), a view he shares with Nkrumah: 
“Capitalism at home is domestic colonialism” (from the 1970 edition of 
Consciencism, quoted in Hountondji, 1983:144).
So there is in essence a conceptual discontinuity between Africa’s “ internal 
pluralism” and its Marxism. Is this true? Hountondji’s unstated premise is clear: 
the idea o f the national culture is a colonial import, aided and abetted by capitalist 
economic structures -  an idea which is in conflict with domestic pluralism
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(conceived as community-centred social organizations). But just how does 
Marxism fit the domestic picture?
I have argued that the connection between traditional forms o f social 
organizations (communitarianism) and Marxism is historical rather than 
conceptual -  and my argument has been that in South African society racial 
stratification has been the most significant historical factor accounting for the 
appeal o f Marxism. It is true that communitarians and M arxists adopted much 
the same view o f justice. Justice is in essence a remedial virtue, a remedy for 
some defect in community. But regarding the nature o f the defect there is much 
dispute. Communitarians standardly appeal to the remedial virtue o f justice as a 
way of settling (potential) conflicts between different conceptions o f  the good. 
Since any account o f justice is a cultural account, based on a supposed identity of 
interests among members o f a (political) community, conflict is viewed as 
dysfunctional, i.e. as destructive o f the common good. Marxists, on the other 
hand, view the defect in the community similarly as a conflict o f  interests, but 
accounts for it in terms o f  the division o f  labour which sets worker against worker 
in unchosen conflict (competition) by which each can develop only at the expense 
of the other.
But, these differences o f  emphasis in what each takes to be the defect in 
community notwithstanding, it seems to me that Marxism found favour because, 
given the circumstances in oppressive colonialism (including its racist forms in 
South Africa), it served as a tool o f social critique.
M arx’s concept o f the labouring process provided a critique o f South African 
society. Now, I believe that Habermas (quoted in Sensat, 1979:41-54) is wrong 
in arguing that Marxist theory cannot serve as critical theory because it overlooks 
the important point that production and socialization are two distinct dimensions 
o f social evolution. Production refers to the appropriation o f  natural resources by 
society for the satisfaction o f  human needs (a process Habermas calls “purposive- 
rational action” (quoted in Sensat, 1979:42). Socialization is the process by 
which people adapt to society through communicative action. This is the process 
leading to a division o f society into two domains -  the “public” (which deals with 
issues o f justice) and the “private” (which deals with issues about the good life, 
and in which individuals are autonomous). Production is governed by technical 
rules, and socialization (communicative action) by social norms validated by 
consensus achieved through normed discourse. Both socialization and production 
are subject to the validity claims o f social discourse.
Rationalization according to Habermas means theoretical-technical insight into 
the realm o f “production”, and practical insight into the realm o f “ socialization” . 
Indeed, two distinct social domains are at issue here: corresponding to the 
“public” and “private”, the former is manifested in the development o f productive
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(technological) forces, the latter in extending communication free of domination. 
The role o f  critical theory is primarily (though not exclusively) to focus on the 
sphere o f socialization and specifically, to develop critiques o f  ideology in the 
interests o f emancipation, since such critiques help to dissolve the barriers to the 
discursive solution to moral and political problems. According to Habermas, 
Marx did not see that developments in these respective realms are logically 
independent o f each other, and so failed to recognize socialization as a dimension 
o f social evolution distinct from production. Marx attempted to reduce the com­
municative dimension to labour, i.e. to production, and this was because 
“ ... Marx unwittingly rules out reflection as a motive force in history by 
categorizing the self-generative process o f the human species as a labor process” 
(Habermas quoted in Sensat, 1997:69).
The upshot is that M arx’s interpretation of history (as the self-generation o f the 
human species through labour) led him to believe that the transition to socialism 
could be ascertained scientifically as inevitable, independently o f what the 
labourer seeking emancipation, happens to think. Habermas thinks that this 
conception o f history is wrong -  justification from history is to be sought from the 
“structures o f linguistically produced intersubjectivity” (Sensat, 1979:161). Marx 
accurately predicted that the state would tamper with economics, but his 
conception o f history could not foresee that such tampering could not be justified 
with reference to market fairness. State intervention was, in fact, the signal for 
the economic door to be opened and for organized labour to demand that the state 
satisfy their legitimate needs -  a function which was standardly left to the market.
Habermas may be wrong because the racist ideology against which Black 
Consciousness struggled in effect obliterated the distinction between production 
and socialization. Though Marx equated historical progress with development of 
the forces o f production, his concept o f the labouring process is pivotal, and in 
South Africa served as the springboard o f emancipation. In South Africa the 
economic door was opened to political decision-making, not by virtue o f the 
failure o f  the ideology o f fair market exchange, but rather the failure of a racist 
ideology. The fact that this increased state power meant that capitalist society in 
South Africa was forced into a crisis of legitimation pertaining primarily to the 
validation o f norms o f political participation for black people.
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